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THEORETICAL PEARL
Control eﬀects as a modality
HAYO THIELECKE
University of Birmingham, Birmingham, UK
(e-mail: H.Thielecke@cs.bham.ac.uk)
Abstract
We combine ideas from types for continuations, eﬀect systems and monads in a very
simple setting by deﬁning a version of classical propositional logic in which double-negation
elimination is combined with a modality. The modality corresponds to control eﬀects, and it
includes a form of eﬀect masking. Erasing the modality from formulas gives classical logic.
On the other hand, the logic is conservative over intuitionistic logic.
1 Introduction
Under the Curry–Howard (or formulas-as-types) correspondence, type systems for
functional languages correspond to certain logics. In particular, purely functional
languages give rise to an intuitionistic logic, whereas languages with ﬁrst-class control
operators give classical logic, as the type of the control operators is double-negation
elimination (Griﬃn 1990) or some variant of it, like Peirce’s law.
Eﬀect systems are extensions of type systems that are more ﬁne-grained and ex-
pressive with regard to computational eﬀects (Lucassen & Giﬀord 1988). Moreover,
for the special case of control eﬀects, they extend the classical typing (Jouvelot &
Giﬀord 1988). The explicit tracking of eﬀectful computations in an eﬀect system
is reminiscent of the way eﬀects are encapsulated in a monad in the approach of
“monads as notions of computations” (Moggi 1989; Wadler 1998). It has also been
noted that the monad type constructor T is a sort of modal operator on top of
intuitionistic logic (Benton et al. 1998).
Thus there is a wealth of connections between these logical accounts. However,
type and eﬀect systems for realistic programming languages can become quite
complex. The aim of this note is to abstract away as much complication as
possible, and to present a simpliﬁed view, in the style of the classical double-negation
transforms as found in proof theory texts (Troelstra & Schwichtenberg 2000).
We consider a version of classical logic in which non-intuitionistic inferences are
tracked by a modality, inspired by eﬀect systems. The modality can be eliminated
under certain conditions, just as eﬀects that stay in some sense local can be
masked in an eﬀect system. The intention is that the logic mediates between
intuitionistic and classical logic, rather as eﬀect systems mediate between functional
and imperative programming. If we erase the modality, allowing classical inference
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Fig. 1. The modally classical logic  c.
to be untrammelled, we get classical logic (Section 3). But an entailment between
pure formulas (those not containing the modality) is intuitionistically valid even if
double-negation elimination and masking have been used in its derivation (Section 4).
2 A logic with a control eﬀect modality
The inference rules for our modally classic logic are presented in Figure 1. The proof
terms consist of a functional language with a control operator. This system is built
up from an intuitionistic subset by adding rules for a modality , a modal variant of
the classical axiom for double-negation elimination, and a form of eﬀect masking.
We discuss these in turn.
The modality A is reminiscent of containing eﬀects in monads in Haskell.
These eﬀects are propagated using rules from Benton, Bierman and de Paiva’s
CL logic (Benton et al. 1998), corresponding to the multiplication and unit of a
monad (Moggi 1989):
Γ,Γ′ c M : A Γ, x : A,Γ′ c N : B
(Let)
Γ,Γ′ c (let x = M in N) : B
Γ c M : A
(Unit)
Γ c (unit M) : A
While these rules were inspired by monads rather than eﬀect systems, they work
similarly (Wadler 1998). In an eﬀect system, arrow types are annotated with eﬀects.
For instance, A
e→ B is the type of functions from A to B with eﬀect e. Rather
than having multiple arrows, we can decompose the eﬀectful arrow into a pure
arrow → and the eﬀect modality . One of the most basic inference rules in an
eﬀect system (Lucassen & Giﬀord 1988) joins together the eﬀects that may happen in
an application: the operator, the operand, or the body of the function being applied
may have eﬀects, all of which are unleashed when the application is evaluated. To
see how that is handled in the modal setting, suppose we want to make an inference
from the following two judgements, where the ‘?’ indicates that a modality may be
present:
Γ  M : ?(A → ?B) and Γ  N : ?A
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If there is a modality in any of the indicated positions, then there must also be a
modality in front of B in the conclusion Γ  . . .M . . . N . . . : ?B. It is not hard to
see that the rule (Let) combined with (→E) conforms to this condition, as (Let)
may be used to strip oﬀ instances of  in the premise to make (→E) applicable, but
requiring a  to appear in the conclusion.
Next, we consider the rule that is speciﬁc to our eﬀects at hand. The double-
negation elimination rule crucially interacts with the -modality:
Γ c M : (A →  ⊥) →  ⊥
(C )
Γ c (C M) : A
This rule stems from a control eﬀect system (Jouvelot & Giﬀord 1988; Thielecke
2003), simpliﬁed to ﬁt the modal setting. To stay as close as possible to standard proof
theory presentations (Troelstra & Schwichtenberg 2000), we use double-negation
elimination, corresponding to a typed version of Felleisen’s C operator (Griﬃn 1990;
Felleisen & Hieb 1992), rather than Peirce’s law ((A → B) → A) → A, corresponding
to typed call/cc. These control operators are interdeﬁnable under mild conditions.
The modality is inserted in those places where the eﬀect system would specify a
control eﬀect, with the combination of → and  emulating the eﬀectful function type.
Intuitively, the ﬁrst occurrence of  in the premise of the rule is required because the
seized continuation jumps when applied to an argument of type A, while the second
occurrence is needed because the function using the continuation may apply it and
cause a jump. The occurrence of  in the conclusion of the rule is needed because
at this point the continuation is seized by the control operator.
For the masking of the modality, we will need a notion of pure formulas P ,
analogous to types that do not contain any free region identiﬁers in an eﬀect
system (Lucassen & Giﬀord 1988). The rule for masking control eﬀects is then a
form of -elimination:
x1 : P1, . . . , xn : Pn c M : P
(Mask)
x1 : P1, . . . , xn : Pn c (mask M) : P
Masking of eﬀects can be understood generically as keeping eﬀects local, so that
they are not observable from the outside via P or any of the P1, . . . , Pn. Logically,
we could read  as a sort of non-standard modality for intuitionists who are not
entirely convinced by classical inference. When double-negation elimination is used
in rule (C ), the conclusion is tagged with the modality to ﬂag this intuitionistic
doubt, which is then spread by the rule (Let). With this interpretation, the masking
rule says that in some restricted cases the doubt should be dispelled even if classical
inference was used locally. The main result will be that the masking rule is in fact
acceptable, due to a translation to intuitionistic logic (Proposition 4.4).
More formally, we will use the following deﬁnitions:
Deﬁnition 2.1
Formulas are deﬁned by the grammar
A,B ::= A → B | ⊥ | α | A
20 H. Thielecke
where we assume inﬁnitely many atomic formulas α. We use Γ to range over contexts
consisting of sequences of the form x1 : A1, . . . , xn : An. Let a pure formula be one
that does not contain any occurrences of the modality , that is,
P ::= P → P | ⊥ | α
Let Π range over contexts containing only pure formulas. We will use three kinds
of inference, c, i and c:
• We write c for inference with the rules from Figure 1.
• We write i for the usual intuitionistic inference with → introduction and
elimination, axiom and falsity, given by the subset of rules (→E), (→I),
(Var) and (⊥E) from Figure 1. Intuitionistic logic consists of derivable pure
judgements of the form Π i M : P .
• We write c for classical inference, given by the rules for i above, together
with the double-negation elimination rule (unconstrained by a modality):
Γ c M : (A → ⊥) → ⊥
(C)
Γ c (C M) : A
Although weakening of contexts is not present as a rule, it is obviously admissible
in all these systems.
Lemma 2.2
If Γ  M : A, then also Γ, x : B  M : A, where  can be any of i, c or c.
Example 2.3
To see how the modality works in derivations, we can derive P c P for some pure
formula P by using double-negation elimination, and then masking the resulting
modality:
(Var)
x : P , k : P →  ⊥ c k : P →  ⊥
(Var)
x : P , k : P →  ⊥ c x : P
(→E)
x : P , k : P →  ⊥ c (k x) :  ⊥
(→I)
x : P c (λk.k x) : (P →  ⊥) →  ⊥
(C )
x : P c (C (λk.k x)) : P
(Mask)
x : P c mask (C (λk.k x)) : P
Computationally, this derivation amounts to seizing the current continuation and
then immediately invoking it. As the continuation does not escape, the control eﬀect
can be masked. In this case, it is easy to see that we could have avoided the classical
rule C altogether, deriving the intuitionistic
x : P i x : P
Section 4 shows that such an intuitionistic derivation always exists if the eﬀect can
be masked, despite the fact that c contains classical logic c in a sense as shown
in Section 3.
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3 Classical logic and the modality
We will show that classical inferences in c can always be represented in c, although
the formulas in the latter may need to contain instances of the modality. To translate
from classical logic to the modally classical one, we systematically add the modality
to all arrows.
Deﬁnition 3.1
We deﬁne a translation (·)+ that introduces  as follows:
(A → B)+ = A+ → (B+)
α+ = α
⊥+ = ⊥
The translation is extended to contexts pointwise. We use the same notation (·)+ for
the corresponding translation on terms:
(MN)+ = let m = M+ in let n = N+ in (mn)
(λx.M)+ = unit (λx.(M+))
x+ = unit x
(AM)+ = let m = M+ in (Am)
(CM)+ = let m = M+ in (C m)
Lemma 3.2
If Γ c M : A, then Γ+ c M+ : A+.
Proof
The proof proceeds by induction over the derivation of Γ c M : A, using the rule
(Let) to strip oﬀ  where necessary. Consider the rule C. By the induction hypothesis,
we have
Γ+ c M+ : ((A+ →  ⊥) →  ⊥)
We infer the required Γ+ c let m = M+ in (C m) : A+ using (Let) and this
inference:
(Var)
Γ+, m : (A+ →  ⊥) →  ⊥ c m : (A+ →  ⊥) →  ⊥
(C )
Γ+, m : (A+ →  ⊥) →  ⊥ c C m : A+
Next, we consider the rule
Γ c M : A → B Γ c N : A
(→ E)
Γ c MN : B
By the induction hypothesis, we have Γ+ c M+ : (A+ → B+) and Γ+ c N+ :
A+. By weakening (Lemma 2.2), the latter implies Γ+, m : A+→B+ c N+ : A+.
Furthermore, from two instances of (Var), we infer using (→ E) that
Γ+, m : A+ → B+, n : A+ c mn : B+
By applying (Let) to that and Γ+, m : A+ → B+ c N+ : A+, we have
Γ+, m : A+ → B+ c let n = N+ in mn : B+
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Finally, by applying (Let) again, we have
Γ+ c let m = M+ in let n = N+ in (mn) : B+
as required. For the rule (⊥E), we again use (Let), whereas for (→I) and (Var) we
use (Unit) to insert the modality. 
If we erase the modality , then c gives us just the usual presentation of classical
logic with the rule for double-negation elimination.
Deﬁnition 3.3
We deﬁne a translation to formulas not containing  as follows:
(A)◦ = A◦
(A → B)◦ = (A◦) → (B◦)
α◦ = α
⊥◦ = ⊥
For contexts, Γ◦ is deﬁned pointwise. Here is how we translate terms:
(MN)◦ = (M◦) (N◦)
(λx.M)◦ = λx.(M◦)
x◦ = x
(AM)◦ = A (M◦)
(let x = M in N)◦ = (λx.(N◦)) (M◦)
(unit M)◦ = M◦
(C N)◦ = C (M◦)
(mask M)◦ = M◦
Lemma 3.4
If Γ c M : A, then Γ◦ c M◦ : A◦.
Proof
The proof proceeds by induction over the derivation of Γ c M : A, constructing a
derivation Γ◦ c M◦ : A◦ by cases on each derivation step. The intuitionistic rules are
mapped to themselves; C is taken to C, while instances of (Mask) and (Unit)
are omitted from the derivation in c. An instance of the rule (Let) is taken to the
following derivation steps:
Γ◦, x : A◦ c N◦ : B◦
(→I)
Γ◦ c (λx.N)◦ : A◦ → B◦ Γ◦ c M◦ : A◦
(→E)
Γ◦ c (λx.N◦)M◦ : B◦
This idiom is familiar as the encoding of let-bindings in terms of lambda abstraction
and application. 
Proposition 3.5
We have Γ c M : A for some term M if and only if Γ+ c N : A+ for some term
N.
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Proof
The ‘only if’ direction is Lemma 3.2 with N = M+. For the converse, suppose
Γ+ c N : A+. By Lemma 3.4, this implies (Γ+)◦ c N◦ : (A+)◦. As (B+)◦ = B
for any classical formula B, we have Γ c N◦ : A. 
Proposition 3.5 means that c accommodates classical logic as the image of (·)+,
the subset in which → and  are always combined, as in A → B. However, c
is more ﬁnegrained in that it can distinguish between A → B and A → B, just as
an eﬀect system diﬀerentiates between functions that may or may not have eﬀects.
The ability to make this distinction enables c to contain intuitionistic logic as well,
without classical inference leaking into intuitionistic ones uncontrollably.
4 CPS transform and conservativity
To relate c to intuitionistic logic, we deﬁne a double-negation transform. Unlike
the standard transforms, it uses the modality  to decide where to insert double
negations.
Deﬁnition 4.1
Let α0 be some designated atomic formula not used elsewhere in the translation of
judgements. We deﬁne a transformation (·) from c to intuitionistic logic as follows:
A → B = A → B
A = (A → α0) → α0
⊥ = ⊥
α = α
The transformation is extended to contexts pointwise. The corresponding translation
on terms is as follows:
MN = M N
λx.M = λx.M
x = x
AM = AM
let x = M in N = λk.(M (λx.Nk))
unit M = λk.(kM)
C M = λk.M (λx.λh.(k x)) (λy.A y)
mask M = M (λx.x)
In continuation terms, α0 is the answer type of our transform. The signiﬁcance of
choosing α0 to be fresh is that we can therefore substitute other formulas for it
without aﬀecting the surrounding formula. To do so, the following lemma will be
needed, where the substitution of α by B in A is written as A[B/α].
Lemma 4.2
If Γ i M : A, then also Γ[B/α] i M : A[B/α].
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We can now show that (·) is a translation from our modally classical logic to
intuitionistic logic, in the sense that judgements are preserved.
Lemma 4.3
If Γ c M : A, then Γ i M : A.
Proof
The proof proceeds by induction over the derivation of Γ c M : A. The most
important case is the rule
Π c M : P
(Mask)
Π c mask M : P
for masking. The idea is the same as the insertion of a control delimiter in a CPS
transform whenever a control eﬀect is masked (Thielecke 2003). By the induction
hypothesis, we have
Π i M : (P → α0) → α0
Hence by Lemma 4.2, we also have
Π[P/α0] i M : ((P → α0) → α0)[P/α0]
Now, pure formulas are left invariant by the translation and in particular do not
contain α0. Thus Π i M : (P → P ) → P . From this and Π i (λx.x) : P → P , we
infer Π i M (λx.x) : P , as required.
Of the remaining cases, the most interesting is the modal double-negation
elimination (C ), as it is analogous to typechecking the call-by-value CPS transform
of a control operator, using Lemma 2.2 to propagate the current continuation. So
to check this case, let B abbreviate the following formula from the translation of
the premise of rule (C ):
B = (A →  ⊥) →  ⊥
= (A → ((⊥ → α0) → α0)) → ((⊥ → α0) → α0)
We need to show that Γ i M : B implies Γ i C M : (A → α0) → α0. To do so, we
ﬁrst note that
Γ, k : A → α0 i λx.λh.(k x) : A → (⊥ → α0) → α0
As we have Γ, A → α0 i B by Lemma 2.2, we infer from that by (→E),
Γ, k : A → α0 i M (λx.λh.(k x)) : (⊥ → α0) → α0
Now, we also have by (⊥E) and (→I),
Γ, k : A → α0 i (λy.A y) : ⊥ → α0
and so by (→E),
Γ, k : A → α0 i M (λx.λh.(k x)) (λy.A y) : α0
and ﬁnally by (→I),
Γ i λk.M (λx.λh.(k x)) (λy.A y) : (A → α0) → α0
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as required. In continuation-passing terms, k : A → α0 is the current continuation
that is seized by the control operator, while h : ⊥ → α0 is a continuation that is
ignored. 
As is typical for double-negation translations, Lemma 4.3 tells us that we can avoid
classical rules at the expense of additional arrows in formulas, just as we can avoid
control operators in functional programming by rewriting the code to use explicit
continuation passing instead.
Our main result is that the logic c is conservative (Troelstra & Schwichtenberg
2000) over intuitionistic logic.
Proposition 4.4
If Π c M : P , then Π i M : P .
Proof
The result follows from Lemma 4.3, since for pure P , we have P = P . 
The conservativity tells us that in judgements only involving pure formulas, we can
always avoid the extra rules of c by rewriting the derivation into an intuitionistic
one for the same judgement.
5 Conclusions
The logic c is intended as an extremely distilled form of control eﬀect sys-
tem, including a variant of eﬀect masking. Real eﬀect systems are much more
sophisticated, including eﬀect and region polymorphism; on the other hand, they
may also seem ad hoc and complicated, and eﬀect masking is often explained in
terms of implementation-speciﬁc techniques, such as stack allocation. By contrast,
Proposition 4.4 aims to look at eﬀect annotations in a more traditional logical
setting, as a conservative extension.
This conservativity of eﬀects at the level of types complements Felleisen’s notion
of expressiveness Felleisen (1991), where it is characteristic of eﬀects that they are
not conservative extensions in terms of observational equivalence, which is taken
as evidence of an increase in expressive power. As a direction for further research,
one could aim to reconcile the conservativity and the non-conservativity: it appears
that the breaking of contextual equivalences is due to those eﬀects that cannot be
masked. More speciﬁcally, recall that in Example 2.3, we masked a term whose
control eﬀects were not externally visible:
x : P c mask (C (λk.k x)) : P
It is interesting to note that using the equational axioms for the C operator Felleisen
& Hieb (1992), one can infer C (λk.k x) = x, and clearly the pure term x witnesses
the entailment x : P i x : P . This situation suggests that terms with masked eﬀects
could be re-written into equivalent ones without eﬀects, so that they could not in fact
break any equivalences that hold only in the absence of eﬀects. However, proving
such a result on terms appears much more technically involved than the simpliﬁed
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account at the level of types given here. Equational reasoning based on answer type
parametricity, as used for the equivalence of two CPS transforms (Thielecke 2004),
may be a promising technique. It is also possible that analogous conservativity over
intuitionistic logic holds for other eﬀects, such as state with assignment, although
in that situation we would no longer have the Curry–Howard correspondence to
classical logic that is speciﬁc to control eﬀects.
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